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LAY ATTORNEYS
IN CANONICAL
MARRIAGE CASES
RT. REV. MARION J. REINHARDT*

A

N
ATTORNEY WOULD BE the last one to assume an obligation in a

legal capacity without proper preparation. The question immediately arises as to the requirements to practice canon law. Canon 1657
specifies that to be such an attorney one must at least have a doctorate or
be otherwise truly skilled in canon law. The doctorate in canon law is
earned by completing a three-year course of study in canon law at a
pontifical university.' Catholic University, Washington, D.C., is the only
pontifical university in the United States which has a school of canon
law. In view of a declaration of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries
and Universities, issued May 23, 1948, a licentiate degree may suffice,2
which degree may be obtained after two years of required coursesA Canon
1657 uses the word "at least" because canonical cases frequently presuppose concepts taken from other studies, e.g., a case involving the
validity of baptism would lead one to theology for a specification of the
necessary matter and form of this sacrament.
A layman pursuing a course in canon law might encounter some difficulty in the use of Latin. The Code of Canon Law is in Latin. Most commentaries on the Code are in Latin to permit their use throughout the
world. The decisions of the Sacred Roman Rota, which are published
annually but always ten years after they are given, are in Latin. Most of
the current literature in canon law is likewise in Latin.
A reading knowledge of Latin is a necessity for a canonist, especially
to acquaint himself with the jurisprudence of the Rota. Frequently one
hears the comment that the decisions of the Sacred Roman Rota are not
binding on the lower courts. It is correct that canon law does not have
the doctrine of "stare decisis," but Canon 20 does specify that if there is
* S.T.B., Gregorian University-Rome; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law;
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no general or particular law governing a
matter, among other sources the usage and

practice of the Roman Curia must be considered as supplementary law. For marriage
cases there is no greater source of knowledge of the usage and practice of the Roman
Curia than the jurisprudence of the Rota,
which can only be learned by a study of the
4
published cases.
In addition to the required study, to be
recognized as an attorney in an ecclesiastical trial there is the requirement of approval of the bishop of the diocese. 5 Such
approval, naturally, would only be given to
one about whose character and reputation
there is no question.
It might be noted that the Official
Catholic Directory of the United States,
published annually, lists many clergy as approved attorneys who have not had the required studies. Canon 1657 does permit the
approval of an attorney without the required
formal study in the case of one who is truly
skilled in canon law. The seminary curriculum requires extensive courses in canon law
and frequently a bishop will be able to find
among his priests some who have been outstanding in this field, and especially in the
substantive law of marriage.
Another factor which might discourage
an attorney from obtaining the necessary
qualifications and seeking approval to practice in canon law is the matter of remuneration. Every professional man is willing and
ready to do his share of charity but justly
he feels that a client who has the means
should be disposed to pay a reasonable fee.
No one should object to this in principle.
On the other hand, Canon 1909, Section 1
specifies that ecclesiastical authority is to
4S.R. Rotae Decisiones, 6 maii 1941, coram
Wynen, dec. XXXIII, n.9, vol. XXXIII (1941),
pp. 367-70.
5
Can. 1658, §1.

determine the fees to be asked by attorneys.
In general, canonical attorneys in the
United States have been priests and they
have been giving their services gratuitously.
Although the parties to an action can be
forced to defray the expenses of the process,
in practice they are asked to pay a very
small percentage of the actual expenses. It
is approximately estimated that the costs of
an ordinary canonical trial are at least between eight hundred and one thousand dollars, while the parties generally are only
asked to pay from one hundred to one
hundred and fifty dollars. To this sum are
added any exceptional expenses, e.g., medical and psychiatric experts, copies of medical records, etc. In these estimations there
is not considered the work of those who
give their time and efforts without recompense, e.g., collegiate judges, notaries, attorneys. Some tribunals ask for no payment of
fees whatsoever.
Could this be changed to permit the court
to receive reimbursement for its expenditures and to permit attorneys to receive
reasonable fees? The answer can only be
given by the bishop of the diocese. Up to
the present time merely token fees have
been rquested of parties to avoid the well
known accusation that "you can get a church
annulment if you are willing to pay for it."
Bishops have preferred and apparently continue to prefer to have the diocese assume
the greater part of the tribunal expenses.
They have called upon priests who are
working in parishes and who are exceptionally skilled in canon law to offer their services gratuitously either to the tribunal or
as attorneys to the party litigants.
It has been suggested that lay canon
lawyers would be able to expedite canonical
processes and help to bring them to an
earlier conclusion. This suggestion presup-
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poses that the time consumed at present for
a canonical process is greater because of
our priest-attorneys. This is not necessarily
so, nor is it usually the case. Unlike practice
before our civil courts, the attorney does
not have a very active part in the probative
stage of the process. Unless by exception,
he is not permitted to be present at the
questioning of the parties or witnesses. In
this connection one should remember that
in canonical practice, where the salvation of
souls or the public good is involved, the
court is always empowered to and it is expected to supply any proof which a party or
an attorney has overlooked.6
In the canonical process the attorney will
assist the plaintiff in preparing his bill of
complaint of nullity. He also assists his
client in finding witnesses who have helpful
information about which they can testify.
The attorney offers to the court the points
about which the witnesses are to be interrogated.
The attorney's brief on behalf of his client
will take most of his attention. It is not uncommon experience that a priest-attorney,
even though he is actively engaged in parochial work, consumes more time in writing
his brief than would normally be expected.
A brief speedily prepared could leave much
to be desired. A lay attorney would also
wish to give proper consideration to his
study of the case and to the preparation of
his brief. Priest-attorneys in general take no
more time to prepare their cases in the interest of nullity than do the priest-defenders
of the bond whose duty it is to argue for the
validity of the bond.
In addition to the attorneys who take part
in canonical judicial procedures, most dioceses make available trained canonists who
can be consulted, free of charge, on canon6 Can. 1618.
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ical matters. Most frequently these priests
have an office at the diocesan curia or chancery. They will give counsel as to whether
there is reasonable hope of success in presenting a bill of complaint of nullity or
whether the accusation of nullity is without
foundation. Because this supplying of gratuitous legal counsel is not specifically provided for in the Code of Canon Law, there is
no uniformity in terminology. In some chanceries they are called notaries; in others,
assistant chancellors, vice-chancellors, or
canonical consultants. In most instances
these same priests will take an active part in
preparing administrative cases for immediate decision or for transmission to the
Roman Congregations. In some cases this
same priest who gave the initial canonical
advice prepares the bill of complaint of nullity and follows the case, acting as attorney
in the judicial process. This is an ideal situation but it requires a greater number of
priests in the diocesan chancery than
bishops generally are able to assign to this
work.
Before proceeding further in this discussion as to whether lay attorneys should be
encouraged to interest themselves in canonical matrimonial processes, certain points
must be clarified. The first distinction that
must be made is between administrative
cases and judicial cases. Judicial cases are
those which are reserved to the diocesan
court or tribunal. In matrimonial matters
these are cases where it is contended that
the matrimonial bond is invalid, null and
void. In the ordinary judicial process the
decision must be given by a court of three
judges, and a finding for nullity is not effective unless it is confirmed by a court of
second instance to which there is a necessary
appeal by the defender of the marriage
bond.
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From the ordinary judicial processes are
exempt certain specific cases mentioned in
Canon 1990, where the nullity is evident
and it can be proved by documents. Canon
1990 provides for a summary judicial process. Its use is restricted to cases of nullity of
marriage where the grounds are consanguinity, a previous marriage, affinity, spiritual relationship, disparity of worship,
sacred order, or a solemn vow of chastity.
This summary judicial process bears a
similarity to Section 3212 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules. In the canonical summary process one judge, the bishop
of the diocese, gives the decision. The decision is immediately effective unless the
defender of the marriage in his discretion
appeals to the court of second instance.
To the ordinary judicial process are reserved all marriage trials in which the alleged grounds of nullity are other than those
listed for the summary process of Canon
1990, e.g., lack of proper contract, force
and fear, etc. Also, those cases which ordinarily permit this summary process must be
remanded to the ordinary process if the
nullity is not evident.
Judicial matrimonial cases are distinguished from administrative cases. For the
most part, administrative cases are concerned with the dissolution of marriage.
Here, presumably, the marriage is valid, or
at least its validity is not brought into question. A dissolution of the existing bond is
requested either on the grounds that the
marriage has never been physically consummated or in the interest of a convert to
the faith or in the interest of one who is
already a member of the Church. The latter
categories include the use of the Pauline
privilege and the use of the so-called Petrine
privilege, as in the "favor of the faith" case.
Beginning in the fifteenth century, the

Church has taught that a valid marriage,
even between two baptized persons, can be
dissolved, provided it has not been physically consummated. This power is reserved
to the Apostolic See. In practice, the Church
does dissolve such a marriage if there is sufficient proof of non-consummation and if
the circumstances warrant such a dissolution.
In the Pauline-privilege case, the principal
proof required is that both parties were unbaptized at the time of their marriage. When
this has been verified, and when it is certain
by means of interpellations that the unbaptized party intends neither to accept baptism
nor to continue to live peacefully with the
converted spouse, the local bishop may permit the convert to contract a new marriage.
Regarding the "favor of the faith" case,
there must be proof that one party had
never been baptized before the marriage. If
the one who had remained unbaptized before the marriage subsequently has been
baptized and he is seeking the favor of the
dissolution in the interest of his new faith,
there must likewise be proof that the marriage had not been physically consummated
after the baptism of the convert. The underlying principle is that the valid marriage
between two baptized persons, consummated after the baptism of both parties, can
be dissolved by no human power, including
that of the Supreme Pontiff. As long as one
party to a marriage remains unbaptized, or
if the marriage has not been physically consummated after both parties have received
Christian baptism, the marriage can be dissolved when the best interests of the Christian faith recommend it. This power to
dissolve is exclusively in the hands of the
Roman Pontiff. In this matter His Holiness
acts through the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office.
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Likewise processed in an administrative
manner are cases of presumed death and
cases of nullity where the grounds are lack
of canonical form. The bishop of the diocese is empowered to decree when in the
absence of a certificate of death there is sufficient evidence from which it can safely be
inferred that a marriage bond had ceased
by the death of one of the parties. Also, by
a simple decree the bishop of the diocese
can declare that a marriage, which was attempted by a Catholic without the canonical formalities of marriage, is null and
void because of the lack of such canonical
formalities.
Why are these cases of lack of canonical
form and of presumed death treated administratively rather than judicially? In the case
of forming a presumption of death, there
is no question of the validity of the marriage
bond. If the other party is deceased, there
could hardly be an adversary proceeding.
If the local bishop cannot arrive at moral
certitude to draw an inference of the death
of the missing spouse, the case is referred
to the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, if both parties to the marriage were
Catholic, or to the Sacred Congregation of
the Holy Office, if at least one of the spouses
was not a Catholic. Administrative procedure was undoubtedly adopted for the
lack-of-form case because of its apparent
simplicity. Generally, it is immediately
evident whether one is obliged to the
canonical form of marriage. Since January
1, 1949, baptism conferred in the Catholic
Church is sufficient to bind to the canonical
solemnities. Conversion to the Catholic
faith also bears with it the obligation of observing the canonical form. Between May
19, 1918 and January 1, 1949, an exemption
from the canonical form was given to persons, born of non-Catholic parents, who, al-
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though baptized in the Catholic faith, were
raised without any Catholic training. If the
obligation to observe the canonical form of
marriage remained doubtful, it was understood that the doubt had to be resolved by
7
the ordinary judicial process.
However, diocesan officials, faced with
questions which arose about the obligation
to observe the canonical form of marriage,
and especially trying to interpret the phrase
"without any Catholic education," soon
found it more advantageous and expeditious
to refer such doubtful cases in administrative recourse directly to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, rather than to their
own diocesan tribunals. This was very reasonable because such doubts concerned
questions of law rather than of fact, and ultimately they would have to be resolved by
the Apostolic See.
Considering this distinction between judicial cases and administrative cases, it
would be inaccurate to say that all marriage
cases pending in a diocesan curia are under
the consideration of the matrimonial court.
A considerable percentage of such cases,
perhaps even more than half of them, are
handled administratively and, therefore, they
do not come before the court. It is true that
in many dioceses the officialis or ordinary
diocesan judge also has delegated power to
review administrative cases, but this does
not relate to his office as such. It is likewise
inaccurate to speak of a matrimonial court
because the jurisdiction of the diocesan tribunal is not limited to matrimony.
In administrative marriage cases there is
little part for an attorney to play. In cases
concerning the non-consummation of mar7 S.C. de Sacramentis, Instructio servandaa Tribunalibus Diocesanis in pertractandiscausis de nullitate matrimoniorum, 15 august 1936, n.231, § 2-

Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXVIII (1936), 359.
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riage, the faculty issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, which permits
the local bishop to institute and complete
the process of the proof of non-consunmation, specifically mentions that the petitioner must be advised that in these cases
there is no place for the work of attorneys.
If the priest delegated to gather the proofs
is remiss in any way, experience shows that
the Sacred Congregation is quick to order
directives to supply the additional proof
either in the interests of the petitioner or for
the safeguarding of the bond of matrimony.
The detailed instructions which are intended to safeguard the delicate sense of
Christian modesty of the spouses and at
the same time to arrive at truth make no
provisions for the intervention of an attorney on behalf of the petitioner or respondent. The one delegated to hear the testimony
of the spouses and of the witnesses and to
collect necessary documents must be a
priest.8
The norms issued by the Supreme Sacred
Congregation of the Holy Office for the
process of obtaining the "favor of the faith"
or the so-called Petrine privilege likewise
make no mention of attorneys. 9 Again, the
delegated priest will interrogate the parties
and witnesses to bring out all of the truth,
both those facts which favor the petitioner
as well as those which would tend to show
that the privilege of the dissolution could
not be granted in this instance.
Both the process to prove non-consummation and the process to obtain the "favor
of the faith" have some similarity to the
8 S.C. de Sacramentis, Regulae servandae in pro-

cessibus super matrimonio rato et non-consum-

mato, 7 maii 1923-Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XV
(1923), 389-436.
9 Suprema Saera Congregatio S. Officii, Normae
pro conficiendo processu in casibus solutionis vinculi matrimonialisin favorem fidei per Supremam
Summi Pontificis Auctoritatem, 1 maii 1934.

judicial procedure. The priest delegated to
conduct the process must follow judicial
procedure in interrogating the parties and
witnesses. The defender of the bond must be
cited for all sessions and he is obliged to
write a brief. But in each instance the proceeding is essentially that of an investigating
committee officially assigned to the task but
having no power of judgment. The acts are
forwarded to the appropriate Congregation
in Rome which in turn recommends to the
Holy Father that the favor be granted or
denied.
The remaining administrative marriage
cases, the Pauline privilege, the presumed
death, and the lack-of-form case, have no
prescribed procedure. We might say the
same thing concerning the probative stage
of the judicial summary process provided
for in Canon 1990. Documents are gathered; affidavits are prepared. It is sufficient
that the operative facts are established beyond a reasonable doubt. Unquestionably,
a lay canonist could prepare the proofs for
such a case, but the question remains
whether it would be to the best interests of
the client that he do so. Generally this work
is carried out by priests assigned to the chancery staff. Each chancery has its own printed
questionnaires to bring out the desired information from the witnesses. The chancery
official is able to call on parish priests in all
parts of the diocese to obtain these affidavits. It is the usual experience that these
questionnaires are returned to the chancery,
properly executed within a reasonable
period of time. If the case is urgent, prompt
attention is requested and received. There
are exceptions, but usually these are caused
by the reluctance of the witnesses to cooperate. In this regard the lay canonist would
be just as frustrated as the cleric. In our
country ecclesiastical courts are powerless

10
to compel witnesses to testify, except by
ecclesiastical censure which is seldom used.
Another advantage which the chancery
official has over the lay canonist in gathering
proofs for administrative cases is the ease
with which he is able to avail himself of the
world-wide cooperation between episcopal
curias. This is especially important today
because of the migration of peoples. Canon
1570, Section 2 requires all ecclesiastical
courts to cooperate with each other in
delivering citations, taking testimony, etc.
A similar provision exists in the official
norms for the "non-consummation" process.
Although nothing is mentioned in the law
about cooperation between curias and chanceries for administrative matters, such cooperation de facto exists. It is an everyday
occurrence that a priest attached to the
chancery staff calls upon the vicar general
or chancellor of another diocese in our
country or in another part of the world to
obtain documents and affidavits for the
processing of administrative cases. Generally, such cooperation is given gratuitously
unless there are exceptional expenses. A lay
canonist could call upon confreres in distant
parts for assistance, but it is very questionable whether such assistance could be obtained as easily, as readily, and with such a
minimum of cost.
It is in the ordinary judicial process that
a qualified lay canonist could have an effective role. Almost all attorneys approved by
the Apostolic Signatura and by the Sacred
Roman Rota and admitted to practice before
these tribunals are laymen. Occasionally
attorneys approved at the Rota plead cases
before local diocesan courts. A layman with
the usual obligations of life toward himself
and toward his family, before he prepares
himself with the necessary scholastic qualifications, will have to consider whether he
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can expect a commensurate return from his
canonical practice to justify his years of
studying. As has been stated above, there
can be little promise of such remuneration.
The policy of gratuitous legal assistance is
of long standing.
Would a change of policy permitting
attorneys to receive reasonable fees in
canonical cases and encouraging laymen to
prepare themselves for this work eliminate
or help to eliminate delays in solving cases
which are presented to diocesan courts? It
seems that the answer is in the negative
because the present delays which exist are
not caused by the attorneys.
The formalities of the canonical process,
especially those of the ordinary judicial
process, are responsible for much of the
delay. All of the acts of each case must be
either typed or printed. Handwritten copies
would suffice but this method is of the past
and would only be more time-consuming.
Because the attorneys for the parties are
not permitted to be present at the hearings,
they can only begin their study of the case
after the formal publication of the acts. The
attorneys for the parties, just as the defender
of the marriage bond, must present their
summations of the case in writing in the
form of a legal brief.
In accordance with Canons 1014 and
1869, Section 1, the court must be morally
certain of the nullity of the marriage before
it can cause to issue an affirmative decision
of nullity. All prudent doubt must be answered in favor of the validity of the marriage. A preponderance of evidence in favor
of nullity does not suffice. This causes the
court to conduct extensive investigations
which might otherwise be considered unnecessary. Letters rogatory are sent to other
tribunals for the testimony of witnesses who
cannot appear at the trial court. If the trial
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court finds that the nullity has been proved
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it must state
its findings of fact as well as its conclusions
of law in its written decision. The decision
must show that the findings of fact were
arrived at in accordance with the established
canonical principles of evidence.
Possibly, an unwarranted amount of time
is consumed by the court itself in the writing
of its decisions and by the defender of the
marriage bond in the brief on behalf of the
validity of the marriage. Great attention is
given to form, to the citation of authorities,
to an analysis of the testimony of the parties
and witnesses. Ecclesiastical judges do not
enjoy the luxury of legal secretaries with the
result that the time occupied in legal writing
cannot be given to more fruitful work. The
ecclesiastical court is always mindful not
only that its decisions are open to judicial
appeal to a court of second instance, but also
that all its affirmative decisions are reviewed
each year in an administrative manner by
the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments.
The same Congregation each year requires
a copy of all the briefs of the defender of the
marriage bond for the cases in which the
court had found for the invalidity of the
marriage.
Special attention must be given to the
writing of the decision in an ecclesiastical
court because on judicial appeal, not only
the law but also the facts are reviewable. It
is not sufficient to find that the trial court
could reasonably have found the facts as it
did, but the court of second instance itself
must be morally certain "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the operative facts have
been established in accordance with the
laws of evidence. A reversal on the facts is
more common than a reversal on the law.
Unquestionably some delay in processing
marriage cases, both judicial and adminis-

trative, could be removed by increasing the
personnel of the chanceries and tribunals.
This resolves itself into a question of the
availability of vocations. Souls are at stake
in marriage cases, but they are also deeply
affected by the spiritual administrations of
the parish priests. Ultimately, the bishop
must determine how many priests he is able
to assign to the various fields of priestly
work in his diocese. If laymen see fit to train
themselves in canon law, undoubtedly they
could accomplish more by being employed
on a full-time basis in the chancery or in the
tribunal than by opening an office for private practice.
With a few additional canonists, clerical
or lay, along with the much needed secretarial assistance, there is no curia which
could not bring its cases, judicial and administrative, up to date within a short
period of time. There is one thing that must
be remembered especially by those who
speak of the thousands of young people
around the world who are suffering interminable delays awaiting decisions. Not always
does the red light turn to green. Decisions
can be negative just as they can be affirmative. Frequently, there is much disappointment on the day of the publication of the
decision.
It has been suggested that law offices,
staffed with lay and/or clerical experts in
marriage law, be established to help to clear
up the backlog of marriage cases that is said
to exist. If civil attorneys consider it against
their code of ethics to advertise, canon
lawyers should do likewise. But would such
law offices be able to effect the desired end?
First of all, law offices already exist in
many curias. At the present time they are
staffed by clergy. If lay canonical experts
were available, and if there were sufficient
funds to pay an appropriate salary, there is
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no reason why they could not be employed
in the curia. They could not be given an
assignment which requires the use of jurisdiction, but there is much canonical work
which they could perform.
What about an office of canonical experts separate from the diocesan curia? It is
suggested that such canon law experts could
be a boon to chanceries of small dioceses.
It is difficult to imagine how there would be
sufficient canonical work for such an office
of canonical experts if there is not sufficient
canonical work for a canonist of the chancery of a small diocese to keep up in his
field. No matter how small a diocese is,
there will always be the necessity of at least
one priest trained in canon law.
In the Church only a cleric can possess or
participate in, by delegation, the power of
jurisdiction. The decisions in marriage cases
which can be brought to conclusion on a
local level require jurisdiction, either ordinary or delegated. One would not expect the
bishop, even of a small diocese, or his vicar
general, chancellor, officialis or delegate to
rubber stamp the decisions of marriage
cases which have been prepared by a group
of canonists not connected with his curia.
Even though no decision can be given locally, the investigation of "non-consummation" cases and of "favor of the faith" cases
must be performed by a priest delegated by
the bishop.
In recent years there has been voiced the
desire that there be permanently established
in this country a tribunal of third instance
or a local Rota, similar to the Spanish Rota.
Obviously, this is a judicial body, and it
would have nothing to do with such administrative cases as non-consummation or the
favor of the faith. These so-called "Roman
cases" would continue to be referred to the
Roman Curia because they require the in-
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tervention of the Supreme Pontiff for the
dissolution of the marriage.
One wonders whether a local Rota is as
advisable as it first appears. It would
save the costs of translation, and possibly
also those of printing if it would be satisfied
with typewritten carbon copies as our courts
of second instance are at present. As long
as canonical procedure provides for a
judicial review of the facts by a court of
second instance and substitutes the discretion of one bench of three judges for the
discretion of another bench of three judges,
probably a local court of third instance
would be better able to understand the conduct of our people and more easily be able
to draw inferences therefrom. On the other
hand, might such a court not tend to be more
provincial? Is it not possible that the universal "meeting of minds," as is had at the
Sacred Roman Rota, is able to build up a
more valuable jurisprudence, taking advantage of the greater number of cases which
come before that court and the variations
of origins of those cases?
One must bear in mind that if there is
established a local Rota, judicial appeal
from its findings and conclusions would not
always be possible. According to Canon
1903, if two courts agree that the nullity
had not been proved, there is no appeal
unless there is new and weighty evidence.
This law at the present time frequently
prompts a plaintiff who has been unsuccessful in the first instance to appeal directly to
the Roman Rota for the second instance.
If it is found that the Sacred Roman Rota
cannot adjudicate the cases before it in a
reasonable length of time, might it not be
preferrable to increase its number of judges,
rather than to constitute a new tribunal in
the United States? The Roman Rota has
always been able to take care of the cases
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of those who were unable to pay translating
and printing fees. Joining these new judges
to the Roman court, rather than having
them form a separate local tribunal, would
permit them to participate in the more mature, the more secure, the more universal
thinking of the Eternal City. It is not always
true to say that it is better to be first in a
little town than to be second in Rome!
In connection with marriage cases, recently there was heard the suggestion that
there should be created in the Church some
kind of a public defender to protect the
rights of individuals against the abuses of
authority. Do we not already have such a
public defender? Canon 1569 provides that,
because of the supreme episcopal jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, any member of
the Church can have recourse to the Holy
See at any time and at any stage of litigation. Anyone with experience in canonical
practice knows that this offer of assistance
on the part of His Holiness is not an empty
gesture. Requests are frequently sent to the
Holy See and, while many of these are

without foundation, if there is any basis in
law, proper directives are sent to the local
ecclesiastical authority.
The layman trained in canon law probably would find little recompense in private
practice for his years of preparation. The
policy of gratuitous legal assistance is well
grounded in the tradition of the Church in the
United States. Perhaps, in certain sections
those granting this assistance are few, but
in these sections, especially in smaller dioceses, it would be even more difficult for
the lay canonist to find a return from his
investment. In an exceptional case a person
considering himself aggrieved might not
wish to avail himself of canonical legal advice at the very office where he thinks he
has been deprived of his right. For such a
case there are many canonists in other dioceses or in religious communities who
would consider it an obligation in conscience to give competent canonical counsel.
And then there is always the universal public defender.
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cialize in canon law, as some laymen already
do.
There is plenty of business. Of all the

legal tangles people get themselves involved
in, marriage cases are one of the most common. As mentioned before, in many of these
cases the eternal salvation of souls is at
stake and they need all the help they can get.

